Competitive satellite placement and the economic geography of the geostationary orbit

Akhil Rao and Nikodem Szumilo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The geostationary orbit (GEO) carries most of the world's satellite communications revenue. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) coordinates and records frequency assignments and associated orbital positions through national administrations, without creating a market price or property title for longitude. We ask how commercial operators locate along GEO within this administrative regime. Using a spatial sorting model, we show that commercial satellites are placed in proportion to the reachable income below a GEO longitude, discounted by viewing angle at a spatial discount rate. We estimate a placement elasticity close to one, so that satellite counts above a longitude rise proportionately with reachable income. Government satellites, by contrast, are placed in proportion to the population a GEO longitude covers. We validate the commercial model by showing that parameters estimated on 2012 placements predict the 2021 distribution well and that the model rejects treating Chinese GDP as fully addressable to the international commercial fleet. Counterfactuals suggest that competition from low-Earth orbit (LEO) systems may tilt GEO usage toward Asia-Pacific, while higher spatial discounting may concentrate it over high-GDP countries.

Date: 2026-06, Revised 2026-07
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