Selecting Proportional Juries

Eisho Takatsuji

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study the problem of selecting a jury from a qualified panel. Every jurisdiction in the United States (with the exception of Arizona) allows litigants to exercise peremptory strikes on the panel to eliminate potential jurors, with the remaining individuals being seated on the final jury. However, such a system prevents litigants from guaranteeing that the jury is proportional with respect to their preferred characteristic, particularly when only a minority of panel members exhibit that characteristic. Although some legal scholars have suggested affirmative selection, wherein litigants choose whom they want on the jury, as an alternative, this system also does not guarantee proportional juries. In this paper, I formalize ``proportionality" and show that there exists a family of methods that mix peremptory strikes and affirmative selection that allow litigants to guarantee that the jury is proportional with respect to their preferences over the panel.

Date: 2026-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.03980 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2607.03980

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().