Fooling Yourself: how narratives shape beliefs

Andrea Albertazzi, Paolo Pin, Marco Stimolo and Alessandro Stringhi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Decision-makers often receive information through narratives combining diagnostic evidence with details that carry no information useful for inference. We study whether such nondiagnostic details embedded in a narrative affect belief updating. In a laboratory experiment, participants repeatedly report incentivized beliefs in a Bayesian inference task. We implement three conditions with the same statistical structure: an urn problem with diagnostic colored balls and nondiagnostic white balls; the same problem presented as an investigation narrative with diagnostic clues pointing to one suspect and nondiagnostic clues pointing to neither; and the same narrative context with nondiagnostic clues replaced by no-information messages. We find that nondiagnostic details systematically pull participants' beliefs toward 0.5, the point of maximal uncertainty, despite Bayes' rule prescribing no revision. This response is strongest when nondiagnostic clues are embedded in the investigation narrative, although it also occurs in the urn condition. Conversely, it disappears when no-information messages replace nondiagnostic clues.

Date: 2026-07, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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