EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Dynamic Causal Portfolio Choice: Hedging the Rotation of the Common-Driver Manifold

Alejandro Rodriguez Dominguez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: When a portfolio is conditioned on a minimal set of observable drivers under which its assets become mutually independent over the investment horizon, the dynamic investment problem acquires a distinctive geometric structure. We study continuous-time portfolio choice in this setting. The conditioning representation, rather than the asset vector, becomes the natural state of the problem, and it moves: the sensitivity of returns to the drivers depends on the state, the conditioning set may itself change over time, and the induced information geometry both rotates and, at discrete instants, jumps. The optimal policy separates into a static component that allocates along the conditioning geometry at each instant and an intertemporal component that hedges the predictable motion of that geometry, a first-order effect in the model rather than a refinement, placing the coordinates of the information geometry in the role played by exogenous state variables in classical intertemporal asset pricing. Because the problem is organized by the drivers, its computational cost is governed by their number rather than by the number of assets. Changes in the conditioning set generate a risk that continuous trading cannot span, so the market is incomplete in the direction of its own geometry. The analysis is carried out in a controlled diffusion model, and the resulting structure is illustrated on synthetic economies designed to isolate each mechanism.

Date: 2026-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.06702 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2607.06702

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2026-07-09
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2607.06702