First They Came for the Others: A Theory of Divide-and-Conquer

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinyuqi Huang and Wooyoung Lim

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Abstract: Divide-and-conquer tactics often succeed not through mechanical coordination failures, but through epistemic friction regarding an aggressor's underlying intent. When an attacker strikes a first target, bystanders must infer whether the assault represents a localized grievance or a systemic campaign. If the attack is rationally interpreted as particularized, bystanders abstain, prompting the isolated victim to surrender. We demonstrate how higher attack costs and lower correlation between victims' fates facilitate this division. We then study how behavioral responses, rhetoric, treaty commitments, and downstream defense networks modify this inference.

Date: 2026-07
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