A Coordination Theory of NHS Whistleblowing Failure

Ari Ercole

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Persistent whistleblowing failure in hierarchical healthcare organisations is typically attributed to insufficient legal protection for reporters or inadequate managerial incentives to investigate. This diagnosis is argued to be structurally incomplete. A repeated three-player game among a whistleblower, Trust management, and a colleague group is solved via global games techniques to obtain a unique equilibrium, identifying three mechanisms existing policy neither recognises nor addresses.

Date: 2026-07
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