Profiling and Endogenous Valuation

Anh Nguyen and Teck Yong Tan

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Abstract: We study a monopolist facing a buyer whose valuation is determined by pre-trade investment. Before setting price, the seller observes a signal about the buyer's private investment cost (buyer profiling). Information that helps the seller extract surplus can also undermine the buyer's incentive to create it. We characterize the buyer-seller payoffs attainable across all possible profiling. On the Pareto frontier, if investment increases, hold-up risk always raises the payoff that the seller captures faster than the surplus that the investment creates. Protecting buyer welfare therefore requires discouraging investment, even though investment is socially efficient.

Date: 2026-07
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