Local Global Games and Network Common Learning

Olga Rospuskova, Omer Tamuz and Jake Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study global games in which agents coordinate locally, with their social network neighbors, contingent on a favorable state. Before acting, agents learn the private signals of all agents within network distance $r$. As $r$ grows, every agent learns the state, but efficient coordination depends on higher-order beliefs, which are shaped by the geometry of the network. We introduce network common learning, a network analogue of common learning, and show that it is attained when neighboring agents' observations differ by many signals, as on the two-dimensional grid, but fails on networks with informational bottlenecks, such as the line, where only the safe action survives in equilibrium.

Date: 2026-07
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