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Information Aggregation and Social Networks: Responsiveness and Overturning

Shinpei Noguchi, Hiroto Sato and Konan Shimizu

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Abstract: This paper studies how network structures affect the efficiency of information aggregation in social learning environments. We consider a model in which rational agents sequentially choose actions based on private signals and observations of their neighbors' actions in a network. Focusing on comparisons of expected payoffs at a given finite period, we show that there exists an information structure under which the star network achieves a strictly higher expected payoff than any other network, and another information structure under which the complete network achieves a strictly higher expected payoff than any other network. Taken together, these results imply that no network is uniformly optimal across all information structures. Our analysis highlights a trade-off between the responsiveness effect and the overturning effect: disconnected networks preserve responsiveness of actions to private signals, whereas highly connected networks facilitate the aggregation of extreme information that overturns public beliefs.

Date: 2026-07
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