A Multinomial Probit Model for Asymmetric Choice Responses

Cash Looi, Ruben Loaiza-Maya and Didier Nibbering

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Standard multinomial probit (MNP) models specify symmetric latent utility distributions, implying that choice probabilities respond symmetrically to positive and negative covariate shifts of the same magnitude. This restriction is often implausible in empirical choice settings and can lead to misleading elasticity and substitution predictions. We propose a skewed multinomial probit (SMNP) model that captures asymmetric choice responses by specifying a multivariate skew-normal distribution for the latent utilities. The model preserves the flexible substitution patterns of the MNP framework, introduces alternative-specific skewness parameters, and nests the standard MNP model when skewness is zero. Introducing skewness creates identification and computational challenges because the skewness parameters interact with the MNP scale normalization and disrupt the conditional Gaussian updating structure used in Bayesian MNP estimation. We address these challenges through a covariance reparameterization that enforces identification and positive definiteness by construction, interpretable priors on the identified parameter space, and a double data-augmentation scheme that yields a Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs sampler. Numerical experiments and applications to consumer choice data show that SMNP recovers asymmetric choice responses, improves probabilistic prediction, and produces economically meaningful differences in price elasticities and substitution patterns.

Date: 2026-08
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