An axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion

Wataru Kitano and Shohei Yanagita

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Abstract: We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structure, the sender expects that more informative structures might be implemented. We model this by allowing the sender to assess each information structure under worst-case information leakage, represented by a set of more informative structures. The model encompasses a wide range of examples of information leakage, which we also explore.

Date: 2026-08
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