Acquiring irrelevant information as a commitment

Wataru Kitano and Shohei Yanagita

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We formulate the voter's strategic information acquisition to control the future self's action as a Bayesian persuasion problem. Our main result shows that acquiring information that is irrelevant to the voter's objective can be a worst-case optimal solution: it can reduce the possibility that the future self is swayed by additional information whose content is ambiguous to the current voter.

Date: 2026-08, Revised 2026-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.14173 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14173

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().