Coalitional Manipulation and Target Set Correspondences

Toshiya Yoshimura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study coalitional manipulation of interval-valued social choice correspondences on the single-peaked domain. In the single-valued model, strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness coincide within the standard class of peaks-only social choice functions, so generalized median voter rules retain their robustness to coalitional manipulation. This equivalence breaks down once the outcome is allowed to be set-valued: generalized median correspondences may be strategy-proof while remaining vulnerable to coordinated deviations. We show that, among generalized median correspondences allowing genuine set-valued choice, pairwise strategy-proofness already forces anonymity. With voter sovereignty, this restriction becomes sharp and characterizes target set correspondences. Thus, the target-set structure emerges as the form of set-valued flexibility compatible with pairwise coalitional robustness.

Date: 2026-08, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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