EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Characterizing the Plurality Rule via Clone Invariance

Leo Goto

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The Plurality rule is vulnerable to vote splitting between similar alternatives. Defying conventional wisdom, we characterize the Plurality rule through a specific type of clone independence condition. We further introduce the notion of a one-parameter family of $p$-Clone Resistance ($p$-CR), and examine the property within the class of scoring rules. For $p \in (0,1)$, nontrivial rules exist with at most three alternatives, but only the Trivial rule generally satisfies the condition.

Date: 2026-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.18798 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2608.18798

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2026-08-20
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.18798