Learning to Agree under Pseudo-Reciprocity

Shinya Sugiura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We characterize the communication networks that ensure consensus in rational social learning under the sure-thing principle. A network ensures consensus if and only if it is pseudo-reciprocal, a property under which reciprocity may fail between individuals but holds at a coarser group level. Prior work has assumed message exchange to be bidirectional, yet such pairwise reciprocity proves largely dispensable. We show that a single bidirectional link can suffice, however large the population.

Date: 2026-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.22234 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2608.22234

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().