School Choice with Appeals

Claudia Cerrone, Yoan Hermstr\"{u}wer and Josu\'e Ortega

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Abstract: Roughly fifty thousand families in England appeal their school assignments each year through a centralized and understudied procedure that improves the placement of about one in five claimants. This paper shows that appeals are not an institutional afterthought: they change how parents report preferences to the education authority and the quality of placements it generates. Once the appeal stage is incorporated, Immediate Acceptance (IA) becomes less manipulable and can support equilibrium outcomes that Pareto dominate those of Deferred Acceptance (DA) under truth-telling, reversing the DA-IA welfare comparison. In a preregistered experiment, we find results consistent with the theoretical predictions: appeals increase truth-telling in IA, leaving DA essentially unchanged, and widen the IA-DA efficiency gap. Around 60% of the IA efficiency gain appears before any appeal is upheld, because subjects anticipating the possibility of a potential appeal rank schools differently.

Date: 2026-09
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