Cautious and fair social evaluation under risk

Kaname Miyagishima and Kensei Nakamura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we study criteria for social evaluation of resource distributions under risk when individuals have expected utility preferences but their utility functions are interpersonally non-comparable. In particular, we focus on cautious evaluation with respect to ex-post distributions. As a key rationality axiom, we adopt Negative Certainty Independence, introduced by Dillenberger (2010). Using this axiom together with Pareto conditions that are compatible with both the rationality axiom and ex-post equity, we characterize a class of social criteria called Cautious Equally Distributed Equivalent (CEDE) criteria. These criteria evaluate risky situations by the lowest certainty equivalent over a set of social utility functions constructed from individual utility functions.

Date: 2026-09
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