Homophily and transitivity in dynamic network formation

Kevin Dano, Bryan S. Graham and Yassine Sbai Sassi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In social and economic networks linked agents often share connections in common. There are two competing explanations for this phenomenon. First, agents may have a structural taste for transitive links - the returns to linking may be higher if two agents share a common connection. Second, agents may assortatively match on unobserved attributes, a process called homophily. We study parameter identifiability in a simple model of dynamic network formation with both effects. Agents form, maintain, and dissolve links over time to maximize utility. The return to linking may be higher if agents share connections in common. A pair-specific utility component allows for arbitrary homophily on time-invariant agent attributes. We derive conditions under which it is possible to detect the presence of a taste for transitivity in the presence of assortative matching on unobservables. We leave the joint distribution of the initial network and the pair-specific utility component, both high dimensional nuisance parameters, unrestricted. Our identification result is constructive, suggesting an analog estimator, whose finite and (single) large network properties we characterize. We show, via examples, the delicacy of information accumulation in the single (large) network setting.

Date: 2026-09
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