 On testing the incentive compatibility of single-parameter allocation mechanismsJason Milionis and William Pires Abstract: This paper is the first work at the intersection of game theory and property testing, giving algorithms and lower bounds for efficiently testing whether an allocation mechanism is incentive compatible (IC). We propose distinguishing whether a mechanism is $\epsilon$-far from being IC, i.e., when it observes many monotonicity "violations." Conceptually, inspired by the literature on Boolean function monotonicity testing, we construct a tester for discrete single-parameter allocation rules. Technically, our work is the first to consider monotonicity testing of vector-valued functions on the hypergrid. We give a $\tilde{O}(n/\epsilon)$-query algorithm to test whether a function (representing n-player allocation mechanisms) is coordinate-wise monotone versus $\epsilon$-far from it. We also show a matching lower bound: the class of coordinate-wise monotone vector-valued functions on a Boolean hypercube or hypergrid requires $\tilde{\Omega}(n/\epsilon)$ queries to test whether it is $\epsilon$-far from monotonicity, and this holds even if the tester is two-sided and allowed to make adaptive queries. Finally, we extend our upper bound to and give a tester of the same query complexity for pricing functions of allocation mechanisms. This requires overcoming the technical challenge that the path in function space to the closest IC mechanism may involve interdependent changes to both the price and the allocation rule. Date: 2026-09 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.17406 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Papers from arXiv.org |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.