New Approaches to Strategic Thinking in Dynamic Games

Mehmet Mars Seven

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present several models of strategic choice concerning equilibrium reasoning and behaviour, as well as new applications to dynamic games. We propose concepts such as historical equilibrium, simple Nash equilibrium, cautious backward induction, and an approach inspired by how chess players reason in sequential games.

Date: 2026-09
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