Pareto-Improving Pricing: Why 3 Is Better Than 2

Zi Yang Kang and Piotr Dworczak

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the design of priority pricing systems with heterogeneous agents in environments in which improving quality for some agents reduces the average quality that can be provided. Contrary to the equity-efficiency tradeoff emphasized in public debates, we show that under economically natural conditions priority pricing can Pareto-improve on an equal-allocation benchmark. Three priority tiers suffice for such an improvement, combining higher quality for a fee, lower quality with compensation, and an intermediate tier at the benchmark quality; two tiers are never enough. Our results provide a framework for overcoming equity-efficiency tensions in applications such as lane pricing, waiting-line design, public provision, and insurance.

Date: 2026-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.22652 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.22652

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().