Dynamic Disclosure with(out) Timestamps

Aaron Kolb and Beixi Zhou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study how timestamps affect dynamic disclosure. At a random date, a sender privately obtains hard evidence about an evolving binary state and chooses when to disclose it. With timestamps, the unique equilibrium features immediate good-evidence disclosure and timestamp-dependent bad-evidence delay. Without timestamps, high priors relative to impatience generate a stock of undisclosed good evidence, which is stochastically purged before permanent transparency. High impatience yields immediate good-evidence disclosure, while bad evidence can be arbitrarily delayed and disclosed in bursts. Timestamps prevent pretending old good evidence is fresh and certify bad evidence is old, accelerating good-evidence disclosure and facilitating bad-evidence disclosure.

Date: 2026-09
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