Does AI Help or Harm? Endogenous Information Acquisition with AI Advice

Kexin Chen, Tao Lin and Jianwei Huang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: AI advice increasingly enters human decision workflows before costly information acquisition and final action. This paper studies how such advice affects decision quality, measured by the gross utility of the final action. Advice shifts beliefs before the decision maker chooses an acquisition experiment with uniformly posterior-separable (UPS) costs. The analysis characterizes gross effects through the continuation gross value generated by net-optimal acquisition. Convexity of this value function is necessary and sufficient for every AI signal to weakly improve gross utility at every prior, while nonconvexity allows a binary signal to cause gross harm. The criterion gives tight state-space results. Every AI signal is weakly gross-improving in binary-state problems under arbitrary actions, payoffs, and UPS costs. A minimal three-state problem can generate gross harm through concentrated shutdown, where valuable acquisition stops. For classification problems with Shannon acquisition costs, the criterion becomes an active-set slope test. It guarantees weak gross improvement for homogeneous classification and all three-state weighted classification problems, while a minimal four-state failure arises from attention dilution, where acquisition shifts away from high-stake distinctions. Along a Blackwell-increasing mixture path, gross utility can first decrease and then increase. With endogenous interpretation, cheaper interpretation can reduce gross utility.

Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-dcm and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.35137 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.35137

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().