Optimal Project Management

Alessandro Bonatti, Doruk Cetemen and Juuso Toikka

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study optimal dynamic contracts for long-term projects where a risk-averse agent exerts hidden effort to increase the drift of a Brownian process toward a com- pletion threshold. Relative to the first best, the optimal contract slows progress, makes success less likely, induces earlier termination, and narrows project scope. Allowing for costly project resets generates further distortions: resets may be excessive or insufficient depending on the residual effort required afterwards. With endogenous risk taking, optimal incentives introduce penalties for failure and reduce rewards for effort above a critical progress level, resulting in discontinuous and nonmonotonic effort in progress. In the baseline model, the optimal contract can be implemented with linear spot contracts that require no long-term commitment.

Date: 2026-09
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