The Capacity Cost of Informational Screening

Keita Kuwahara

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: An advisor knows who would benefit from using a resource but cannot assign its use. Individuals have private assessments and may ignore advice. We study how their choices can respect a fixed usage limit. In our model, whenever coordination is possible, eliciting private assessments makes some harmful use unavoidable. Policies that maximize welfare, or even minimize harm, also forgo beneficial uses that direct assignment would permit. In those environments, observing assessments instead allows advice to achieve as much beneficial use as direct assignment, without harmful use. The loss therefore reflects the incentive cost of eliciting private beliefs while leaving use voluntary.

Date: 2026-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.39077 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.39077

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().