Social welfare and price discovery in double auction markets

Teemu Pennanen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The tendency of the double auction mechanism to drive prices to competitive equilibrium has been well documented in laboratory experiments, but the phenomenon has lacked a theoretical explanation. This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices implied by their current holdings and preferences. We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.

Date: 2026-10, Revised 2026-10
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