Choice via Ownership Rules

Bhavook Bhardwaj and Marco LiCalzi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made. Specifically, we assume that two agents (individuals or selves) allocate choice tasks over different menus using an ownership rule: the owner of the decision over a menu picks what maximizes his own preference and is accountable for it. We characterize three distinct ownership rules under different (nested) choice environments.

Date: 2026-10
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