Rewarding Informed Voting in PoS Governance

Juan Beccuti and Manvir Schneider

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study reward design for delegated representatives who acquire costly information and vote on a binary governance proposal. Effort improves both private information and delegated voting weight. We show that no payment rule can make sincere voting strictly optimal at every positive effort profile under a non-neutral prior, while fixed budgets limit accuracy in large symmetric committees. We then compare proportional sharing with a conditional rule that rewards only members of a sufficiently large winning coalition. Unlike proportional sharing, which supports sincere voting only through indifference, the conditional rule makes sincere voting strictly optimal at symmetric positive effort profiles. It supports sincere equilibria with the same effort as proportional sharing and, under suitable reward-cost conditions, with strictly higher effort and decision accuracy. Insincere equilibria may nevertheless coexist.

Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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