The lattice structure of the crawler

Hinata Kurashita

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study object reallocation problems with single-peaked preferences. On the unrestricted domain of strict preferences, top trading cycles (TTC) is the unique rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. On the single-peaked preference domain, the crawler introduced by Bade (2019) satisfies the same properties. We show that the Nash equilibrium allocations of the crawler's direct revelation game form a complete lattice under weak Pareto dominance. The truthful allocation is the greatest element of this lattice, while the initial endowment allocation is its least element.

Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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