Strategy-proof voting schemes under single-peaked preferences over intervals

Hao Yu

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Abstract: When a subset of alternatives is allowed to be the collective choice, one approach is to study the social choice correspondence defined on agents' preferences over alternatives. This paper considers a different approach. We argue that agents should have preferences directly over outcomes. We consider the social choice problem on a closed real interval, and assume a single-peaked domain over intervals. Our focus is on the peak-only social choice function, referred to as the voting scheme. The leftright scheme, which generalizes the minmax scheme, is the only strategy-proof voting scheme. Adding anonymity, it reduces to the generalized median scheme. For an odd number of agents, the median scheme is the only voting scheme satisfying efficiency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness.

Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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