Anchor-proofness in Voting with Ranked Ballots

Federico Fioravanti and Zoi Terzopoulou

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: When voters evaluate alternatives sequentially, an anchoring bias makes their ballots depend on the order in which alternatives are presented. For approval ballots, no non-constant voting rule is robust to this dependence. We show that ranked ballots change the picture sharply: a rank-based rule is robust to the presentation order if and only if it is tops-only. Robustness to anchoring is thus available, but only at the price of ignoring everything a voter reports beyond her favourite alternative.

Date: 2026-10
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