Delegate Pricing to Algorithms: When Slow and Steady Wins the Race

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Edward Plumb, Clemens Possnig and Yufei Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the strategic design of learning algorithms in a canonical continuous-time pricing game. We introduce a meta-game in which firms select learning rates for a gradient dynamic, evaluating payoffs as the discounted sum of profits accrued along the entire learning path. We uncover a fundamental dichotomy driven by stage-game incentives: if the stage game exhibits strategic substitutability, firms unambiguously prefer the fastest possible algorithms to rapidly exploit a gradually adjusting opponent. Under strategic complementarity, however, an excessively fast algorithm accelerates the rival's competitive response, destroying transitional profit margins. Even though the competitive price is a strictly dominant action in the underlying stage game, we prove that firms optimally design sluggish algorithms, extracting surplus during a prolonged convergence to the competitive equilibrium.

Date: 2026-10
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