Dictatorial profiles: a proof of Arrow's theorem

Agustin G. Bonifacio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study social welfare rules with strict individual and social preferences. A preference profile is dictatorial for a rule if the social preference coincides with some agent's preference and no agent with a different preference can change the social preference unilaterally. We establish that (i) a rule is dictatorial if and only if all of its profiles are dictatorial; and (ii) if a rule satisfies unanimity and independence (of irrelevant alternatives), then all its profiles must be dictatorial. These results constitute a proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

Date: 2026-10
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