Coalition-Proof Disclosure

Germ\'an Gieczewski and Maria Titova

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study generalized verifiable disclosure by a sender with type-independent preferences. We first characterize all perfect Bayesian equilibria as partitions of the sender's types into coalitions ordered by payoff. An equilibrium survives our coalition-proofness criterion if no group of types can profitably coordinate an announced deviation that only they are able and willing to join. Coalition-proof equilibria are greedy partitions: at each step, a coalition of the remaining types attains the highest payoff consistent with equilibrium. In our general setting, coalition-proof equilibria may fail to exist. We establish existence under restrictions on preferences and evidence: quasiconcavity with message completeness, betweenness, cheap talk with message completeness, and payoff degradation. For a disclosure game with maximally rich evidence, we show that the sender's ex-ante payoff in a coalition-proof equilibrium is a piecewise linear tent over the belief simplex, analogous to the concave closure in Bayesian persuasion and the quasiconcave closure in cheap talk.

Date: 2026-10, Revised 2026-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.15087 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2610.15087

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().