How to Pick a Model if You Must

Mark Whitmeyer

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I axiomatize Berk-Nash equilibrium in decision problems with possibly misspecified models. I specify how a rule--which selects a set of action-belief pairs in a problem--ought to compare a correct forecast with an incorrect one, react to the removal of models, and accommodate additional observations that do not distinguish among the models. Together with axioms concerning attitudes toward randomization and payoffs, and a pair of regularity conditions, these axioms characterize Berk-Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2026-10
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