When an effort-maximizing team architecture is unstable

Siwei Chen and Pengbo Wang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Organizations choose team structures to intensify competition, yet their members may prefer to reorganize. We ask whether an architecture that maximizes aggregate effort can remain stable when contestants may form a replacement team from incumbent rosters. When a coalition draws from identical teams and reproduces their type, its members and the designer rank the reorganization in opposite directions: the coalition gains precisely when total effort falls. A strict effort optimum can therefore supply its own blocking certificate, while a stable optimum can survive only on a plateau where every reachable reorganization of this kind leaves effort unchanged. In a linear benchmark, we characterize stability against every feasible one-team reorganization and global effort maximization over every feasible partition. Except under pair capacity, the two regions do not overlap; with pair capacity, they meet only at one boundary. The ordering persists in a matched quadratic benchmark with strictly convex effort cost, and broader one-step deviation rights cannot restore overlap. Among standardized full-cap designs, the unique stable-effort optimum uses the largest feasible roster and sets incentive concentration at its blocking boundary.

Date: 2026-10
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