Recognizing Dominance through Local Improvement

Linchen Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Strategy-proofness is the traditional standard for predictable behavior, yet participants often fail to play dominant strategies. Most existing simplicity concepts attribute these failures to the cost of contingent reasoning, which they lower by comparing the worst case of the dominant strategy with the best case of an alternative. I argue that there is another approach, one that makes more use of the structure of the strategy set, which I formalize as a neighbor relation. Comparing neighboring strategies can reduce the need for contingent reasoning, and, even with a single contingency, it can simplify the search through the strategy set. I introduce a new simplicity criterion: a mechanism is local improvement solvable under a neighbor relation if repeatedly moving to an improving neighbor always reaches a dominant strategy. Strategy-proofness is the criterion under the coarsest relation, and many classical mechanisms satisfy it under finer ones. In extensive-form mechanisms without duplicate dominant strategies, the criterion under one-situation neighbors is strict action-proofness, which is distinct from obvious strategy-proofness. Among local improvement solvable mechanisms that implement the same outcomes, the criterion predicts more dominant-strategy play where the local comparison is salient.

Date: 2026-10
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