von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in job matching problems

Madhuparna Karmokar and Debasis Mishra

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Abstract: We show that a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set generically exists in the many-to-one job-matching model. Unlike the core, which can be empty in this model, a vNM stable set exists whenever there is a unique efficient matching: the set of all individually rational (IR) and efficient outcomes form a vNM stable set. If an economy has multiple efficient matchings, a vNM stable set may not exist. If the vNM stable sets are required to be rich in a certain sense, then such a rich vNM stable set exists if and only if the set of efficient matchings is essentially unique, and the set of all efficient and IR outcomes forms the unique rich vNM stable set.

Date: 2026-10
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