Agreements Have a Clock: Compute Growth and the Verification of AI Restraint

Li Gan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Rival powers have agreed to limit nuclear arms, phase out ozone-depleting chemicals, and cut greenhouse gases, though each agreement was hard to reach. This paper asks what an agreement to pause frontier AI needs. A follower advances through own research and diffusion from the leader. Because diffusion fades as the gap closes, a paused leader stays ahead longer than its raw lead suggests. A solved agreement game adds voluntary entry, costly monitoring, secret advances, and credible responses. Cooperation is supportable when the monitoring needed to deter a breakout costs no more than either country gains from cooperating. As compute grows during a pause, a secret advance reaches the frozen frontier sooner, shrinking the response window: agreements have a clock. In an example with a fixed leader window, cooperation is supportable through month 18.9. Verified matched safety research extends this to month 25.5, and halving the monitoring cost to month 31.8.

Date: 2026-11
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