Iterated Elimination of Dominated Mixed Strategies

Federico Echenique and Amanda Friedenberg

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This note compares two iterated dominance procedures, one based on eliminating mixed strategies and one based on eliminating pure strategies. It shows that, in compact and continuous games, the mixed-strategy procedure can trail the pure-strategy procedure by at most one round: If the pure-strategy procedure terminates at round $M$, the mixed-strategy procedure terminates at either $M$ or $M+1$, and this bound is tight. It also provides two characterizations of the mixed-strategy procedure that are round-for-round equivalent to it and that require checking for improvements only against opponents' pure strategies.

Date: 2026-11
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