Optimality of Separate Selling with Finite-Support Values

Sho Mikami

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We characterize when separate selling is exactly revenue-optimal in multi-item auctions with additive buyers and independent, finitely supported valuations. For each item, the valuation distribution is identical across buyers, but it may differ across items. We show that, provided at least two items have a strictly positive non-top support value, separate selling is optimal for any number of buyers $n \ge 2$ if and only if top selling, which sells each item only at its highest possible value, is optimal for a single buyer. This equivalence holds under both dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. We then characterize the optimality of top selling in the one-buyer problem through the existence of a particular class of dual flows and derive a necessary condition and several sufficient conditions on the value distributions for its optimality. These conditions reveal a common economic feature, which we call top-value isolation: high non-top valuations must be sufficiently far below the highest value or carry sufficiently little probability mass relative to the probability mass at the highest value.

Date: 2026-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.06101 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2611.06101

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().