Weak Atomic Continuity and Subgame Perfection

Enxian Chen, Wei He, Yeneng Sun and Hanping Xu

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Abstract: Subgame-perfect equilibrium need not exist in continuous games with perfect information when Nature moves. Under standard regularity assumptions, we prove that weak atomic continuity of Nature's transition probabilities yields a measurable pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium for finite and infinite horizons. The condition, originating in the population genetics literature, is necessary for the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium uniformly over the remaining primitives: whenever this condition is violated, one can construct a dynamic game with no subgame-perfect equilibrium, even in behavioral strategies. The proof preserves compactness and upper hemicontinuity of continuation payoff correspondences under integration without requiring convexity.

Date: 2026-11
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