Minority Games and stylized facts

Damien Challet, M. Marsili and Y. -C. Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The Minority Game is a generic model of competing adaptive agents, which is often believed to be a model of financial markets. We discuss to which extend this is a reasonable statement, and present minimal modifications that make this model reproduce stylized facts. The resulting model shows that without speculators, prices follow random walks, and that stylized facts disappear if enough speculators take into account their market impact.

Date: 2001-03, Revised 2001-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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