Modeling Market Mechanism with Minority Game

Damien Challet, Matteo Marsili and Yi-Cheng Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Using the Minority Game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow : producers feed in the information whereas speculators make it away. How well each agent fares in the common game depends on the market conditions, as well as their sophistication. Sometimes there is much to gain with little effort, sometimes great effort virtually brings no more incremental gain. Market impact is shown to play also an important role, a strategy should be judged when it is actually used in play for its quality. Though the Minority Game is an extremely simplified market model, it allows to ask, analyze and answer many questions which arise in real markets.

Date: 1999-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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