Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

Paolo Laureti, Frantisek Slanina, Yi-Kuo Yu and Yi-Cheng Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial web-site gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly sellers they bargained with, vendors are forced to be more honest. This leads to mutual beneficial symbiosis between buyers and sellers; the overall enhanced volume of transactions contributes ultimately to the web-site, which facilitates the matchmaking service.

Date: 2002-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Physica A, Volume 316, Issues 1-4, 15 December 2002, Pages 413-429

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:physics/0207020

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