Condensation in an Economic Model with Brand Competition

L. Casillas, F. J. Espinosa, R. Huerta-Quintanilla and M. Rodriguez-Achach

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Abstract: We present a linear agent based model on brand competition. Each agent belongs to one of the two brands and interacts with its nearest neighbors. In the process the agent can decide to change to the other brand if the move is beneficial. The numerical simulations show that the systems always condenses into a state when all agents belong to a single brand. We study the condensation times for different parameters of the model and the influence of different mechanisms to avoid condensation, like anti monopoly rules and brand fidelity.

Date: 2005-09
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