Fairness State with Plastic Preferences

Elena Ramirez Barrios and Juan G. Diaz Ochoa

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The definition of preferences assigned to individuals is a concept that concerns many disciplines, from economics, with the search of an acceptable outcome for an ensemble of individuals, to decision making an analysis of vote systems. We are concerned in the phenomena of good selection and economic fairness. In Arrow's theorem this situation is expressed as the impossibility of aggregate preferences among individuals falling down into some unfairness state. This situation was also analyzed in a previous model in a network of individuals with a random allocation. Both analysis are based on static preferences. In a real society the individuals are confronted to information exchange which can modify the way that they think. Also, the preference formation of each individual is influenced by this exchange. This consideration reveals why the actual theory is not able to make an accurate analysis of the influence of the individual, or cluster of individuals, in the fairness state. The aim of this investigation is to consider the coupling of two systems, one for the formation of preferences and a second where an allocation of goods is done in an evolutionary environment.

Date: 2006-09
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