Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms

Alejandro Manelli, Martin Sefton and Benjamin Wilner
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Benjamin Wilner: LECG/Navigant Consulting, http://wpcarey.asu.edu/Directory/stafffaculty.cfm?cobid=2133568

Working Papers from Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University

Abstract: We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of efficiency.

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Journal Article: Multi-unit auctions: A comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms (2006)
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