How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

George Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Abstract: We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

Keywords: GAMES; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (1997)
Working Paper: How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (1996)
Working Paper: How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? (1996)
Working Paper: How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:9611

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