How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium

George Mailath, Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels ()

ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution

Abstract: We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of suppol ting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A decision-theoretic implementation of sequential rationality, strategic independence respecting equilibrium (SIRE), is then defined and compared to proper equilibrium, using lexicographic probability systems. SIRE and proper equilibrium difler in which indifference over strategies are appealed to higher level beliefs in a player's lexicographic sequence. Finally, we give tremble based characterizations of the rankings of strategies that underlie proper equilibrium and SIRE that do not involve structural futures of the game.

Keywords: Refinements; proper equilibrium; sequential equilibrium; perfect equi-librium; trembles; lexicographic probability systems; indifference. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/els/esrcls/proper.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (1997)
Working Paper: How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (1996)
Working Paper: How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? (1996)
Working Paper: How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:els:esrcls:045

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ELSE working papers from ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by s. malkani ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).